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AMERICA PROMISES TO COME BACK: A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY
by
James J. Tritten1
President George Bush unveiled a new national security
strategy for the United States in his August 2, 1990 speech at
the Aspen institute. In the audience was Britain's former Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher. Although Mr. Bush remarked about the
United States and United Kingdom "standing shoulder to shoulder,"
and "when it comes to national security, America can never afford
to fail or fall short," the national security strategy concepts
he unveiled would be revolutionary and have direct and dramatic
impacts on NATO and the rest of the world.
Essentially, the President opened the door to a total reex-
amination of America's role in the world and its overall military
capability. Rather than deploy forces at the levels maintained
since World War II, under this new national security strategy the
United States would maintain a much smaller active and reserve
force mix capable of dealing with world-wide major contingency
operations — not a Europe-centered global war with the USSR. If
forces were required to fight a major war against the Soviet
Union, the U.S. assumes that there would be sufficient time to
reconstitute them. Specifically, the President has apparently
accepted the consensus of his intelligence community that the
U.S. will have two year's warning for a Europe-centered global
war with the USSR.
Generally ignored by media due to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
on the same day, the concepts outlined in the President's Aspen
speech were developed by official spokesmen in the following
three months. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, speaking at the
32nd Annual Conference of the International Institute for Strate-
gic Studies (IISS) on September 6th, explained that the new
strategic concepts would form the basis of programming documents
to be made public in early 1991. Cheney noted that a series of
briefings were to have followed the Aspen speech, but that he and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Colin Powell met only
once, on August 2nd, with the chairman and ranking members of the
four major Congressional armed services committees. General
Powell provided details on the new strategy and associated force
structure in two speeches late in August and the former Joint
Staff Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) , Lieutenant
General George Lee Butler, explained even more late in
September
.
The New York Times covered the new strategy on August 2
,
1990, based on leaks of a confidential briefing of the plan to
the President in late June, and subsequent briefings to the De-
fense Policy Resources Board. Pravda . reported Cheney's remarks
at the IISS meeting, and that President Bush had ordered changes
in American security strategy. Secretary Cheney's additional
remarks in Moscow this past October about the strategy and future
force structure were covered by the Soviet press. Only limited
commentary has appeared in the media, 9 engaged in major defense-
associated reporting of events in the Middle East.
Sufficient details of the President's new strategic concepts
are available to make an initial assessment and formulate the
types of ensuing analyses logically required to assess the new
strategy ' s impact
.
The President's New Strategic Concepts
The Strategy and Resources Available
The major factor underlying the reexamination of America's
role in the world, and basic national security strategy, is the
recognition by the Congress and the Administration that the level
of resources devoted to defense in the last decade cannot be
sustained. If the United States consciously attempted to
outspend the Soviet military in a competitive strategy designed
to bankrupt the Soviet economy, then the strategy succeeded.
Unfortunately, American defense spending contributed to, but is
not a principal cause of the U.S. budgetary deficit.
One of the fundamental components of the President's Aspen
speech is that, assuming a two years warning of a Europe-centered
global war with the USSR, the U.S. can generate wholly new forces
- to rebuild or "reconstitute" them if necessary. Specifically,
current forces deemed unnecessary, will be disbanded, not put
into the reserves, since the risk is deemed acceptable. Secretary
Cheney said shortly before his departure from Moscow in October,
that "We are changing our strategy and our doctrine as a result
of changes in the Soviet Union and changes in Europe. We no
longer believe it is necessary to us to be prepared to fight a
major land war in Europe. . .
"
The estimated two-year warning is predicated upon the as-
sumptions that all Soviet ground and air forces will withdraw to
the homeland, that a Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)-
like parity will exist from the Atlantic to the Urals, that the
Soviet Union will remain inwardly focused, and that NATO and its
member states intelligence apparatus are functioning. 11 Soviet
forces are being withdrawn to the homeland, conventional arms
control agreements have been signed drawing forces down drasti-
cally, and the USSR is increasingly inner-focused.
The cornerstone of American defense strategy will likely
remain deterrence of aggression and coercion against the U.S. and
its allies and friends. Deterrence is achieved by convincing a
potential adversary that the cost of aggression, at any level,
exceeds any possibility of gain. Details of the President's new
national security strategy are being debated but remaining active
duty forces are likely to show a significant decrease in the
standing U.S. Army and Ready Reserve forces. According to the
New York Times , the numbers discussed are:
• Army : 12 active, 2 reconstitutable reserve, 6 other re-
serve divisions (currently 18 active & 10 reserve)
• Air Force : 25 active & reserve tactical air wings (cur-
rently 36)
• Navy : 11-12 aircraft carriers (currently 14)
• Marine Corps : 150,000 personnel (currently 196,000)
Originally termed the "base force," i new force structure
advocated by Genera] Powell will be organized into four major
components: Strategic nuclear offensive and defensive; Atlantic;
Pacific; and a Contingency Response Force. This force structure
is not contained in the President's speech but is being developed
in parallel to the President's new strategy. What constitutes
those forces remains debatable, but indications are emerging.
The Strategic Force would include those offensive forces
that survive the START-II process, where numbers like 4 500 and
3000 warheads have been discussed openly during the past year.
Reducing the offensive threat dramatically to such lower numbers
suggests revisiting the suitability of strategic defenses.
General Powell included the strategic defense initiative (SDI) in
his speech of August 30 but no reference to SDI was contained in
the talk by Lieutenant General Butler a month later and it is
likely that strategic defenses will continue as a research and
development (R&D) program.
Although not specified in any speeches and media accounts,
an obvious area that demands clarification is the possible in-
creased nuclear role for naval and air forces replacing ground-
based weapons eliminated from Europe under current and future
arms control agreements. We should watch the 1991 programming
negotiations to see if they include retention of a triad of
offensive forces as a policy goal, or if one or more legs of the
triad may be eliminated.
The Atlantic and Pacific Forces appear to be headed for both
reductions and restructuring. The Atlantic force will include
residual forces remaining in Europe, those forward-deployed to
Europe, and the continental U.S. -based reinforcing force. This
force would be responsible for Europe, the Middle East, and
Southwest Asia. The New York Times report discussed 100,000 -
125,000 military personnel remaining in Europe as part of the
Chairman's revised force structure, although a 50,000 - 100,000
level was openly discussed at the IISS conference. 13 We should
remember the Bush Administration's propensity for counting combat
forces on ships at sea as part of the total forces assigned to
the Middle East contingency operation. Do personnel in Europe
under the President's new strategy include only soldiers and
airmen in ground or air forces combat units or all personnel,
including those at sea?
U.S. forces in Europe cannot be changed without considering
commitments made to allies and the planned employment of American
resources in combined operations under NATO command. The July
1990 NATO London Declaration stated that the Alliance too was
preparing a new "military strategy moving away from 'forward
defense'. . .towards a reduced forward presence. . .". The decla-
ration also stated that "NATO will field smaller and restructured
active forces" and "will scale back the readiness of active
units, reducing training requirements and the number of exer-
cises." 14 Thus it appears that while the United States is con-
sidering major changes in strategy and forces, so is NATO.
General John R. Galvin, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR) , recently told the Defense Planning Committee
(DPC) that he envisaces a change in his primary combat mission
from flexible response and forward defense to crisis response. 15
The centerpiece of this capability would be a standing Rapid
Reaction Corps centered about a multinational corps and the
existing Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Forces. Should these
standing forces not be able to support political decision making,
then additional forces will be mobilized and regenerated or
"reconstituted.
"
Yet rather than attempting to reach an alliance-wide agree-
ment , each nation in NATO is undertaking unilateral force reduc-
tions. France is withdrawing all 55,000 officers and men from
Germany. 16 There is talk in the U.K. of reducing the British
Army on the Rhine by about 50%, demobilizing most of the troops
but retaining regimental identification. Planning in Britain
should include the possibility of a total withdrawal of American
combat units from the continent - among contingencies they should
contemplate. Were this to happen, would the British Army remain
unilaterally forward-deployed, and if so, where? These unilater-
al decisions by member nations will have dramatic impacts on the
NATO war-fighting commanders-in-chief (C-in-Cs) plans for mili-
tary operations and campaigns in the event of war.
General Butler stated ". . .that the U.S. could undertake a
prudent, phased series of steps to reduce modestly our force
presence in Korea, as well as Japan and elsewhere." If the Cold
War was our justification for the large presence of forces in the
Pacific, then if the Cold War is over, it is over in the Pacific
as well. 17 If forces are to be permanently retained overseas, it
will have to be for other reasons. The Pacific force will in-
clude those residual forces remaining in Korea and Japan, those
forward-deployed in the theater, and reinforcing forces located
in the continental U.S. It is not clear if forces assigned to
the Pacific will have a dual commitment to the European theater
in a revitalized "swing strategy" but it should be noted that
Japan-based U.S. forces have participated in Operation Desert
Shield.
Perhaps the most dramatic innovation of the Chairman's
recommended force structure is the creation of a Contingency
Force based in the continental United States. Although the NATO
London Declaration stated that "NATO will rely more heavily on
the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be
needed," apparently most Europeans initially assumed that the
U.S. Army and Air Force would either remain as a major element in
theater or maintain standing active or Ready Reserve forces which
could be returned within a reasonable period. This may not be
the case, and America's promise to return may indeed be within
the two years discussed under the President's new strategy.
The Contingency Force, according to the guidelines in the
President's Aspen speech, will apparently be shaped by the need
to provide an overseas presence and response to regional contin-
gencies with heavy armored forces if needed - not to returr
quickly to Europe. The President alluded n his Aspen speech to
maintaining a forward presence by exercises . General Butler
described planning for regional contingencies as planning for
"graduated deterrence response." Any planning for contingency
responses by the U.S. should include the ability to react to more
than one predicament.
Today's crises are extremely dangerous due to the prolifera-
tion of advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction and the
apparent willingness of Third World nations to use them. High
technology weapons in the hands of Third World nations include:
modern tanks, ballistic missiles and artillery, air defenses,
tactical air forces, cruise missiles, and diesel submarines. All
of this makes conflict in the Third World increasingly destruc-
tive and lethal. U.S. crisis response forces will provide
presence with the ability to reinforce with sufficient forces to
prevent a potentially major crisis from escalating or to resolve
favorably less demanding conflicts.
General Butler provided the most detailed breakdown of the
Contingency Force. The first stage of a Contingency Force to
be used in a "graduated deterrence response," for program plan-
ning purposes, would consist of (in the order stated) : (1) Army
light & airborne divisions, (2) Marine Corps Expeditionary Bri-
gades (MEBs)
,
(3) Special Operations Forces, and (4) selected Air
Force units. It would appear from any such force listing that
ground units would fly to a crisis area, much as they did to
Saudi Arabia.
This initial component of the Contingency Force would be
buttressed as necessary by: (1) carrier forces, and (2) amphib-
ious forces. Normally the Navy prefers to advertise the frequent
call on carrier forces for immediate crisis response, and list-
ing these forces in the second component of the Contingency Force
probably reflects the land orientation of the plan. It would be
wholly illogical to assume that the U.S. will require fewer re-
sponses by carrier battle groups in the future - indeed, a case
can be made that we will send the fleet more often in the future.
The New York Times report listed carriers in the initial crisis
response force but implied that they might not be forward de-
ployed.
The listing of amphibious forces in the second tier seems
appropriate, reflects recent employment of the Marine Corps, and
consistent with the Commandant's recent statement on maneuver
, ip , , ... .
warfightmg doctrine. Amphibious capabilities must be retained
by the United States but in the context of contingency operations
rather than a major assault on Europe. If another D-Day type
invasion were ever required of American forces, amphibious forces
would be among the forces reconstituted and built as was done
during World War II.
The third tier of the Contingency Force appears to be
heavier forces with the capability for long-term sustainability.
10
Again, we have seen tnis application in the Middle East crisis.
Sealift capability disclosed during this crisis will be studied
and may result in new requirements and possibly additional assets
tailored for contingency response rather than the traditional
North Atlantic and NATO scenarios. The U.S. already has many
such assets but may learn from recent experience that modest
increments of additional sealift or prepositioned equipment are
required.
U.S. forces for crisis response appear to emphasize versa-
tility, lethality, global deployability, and rapid responsive-
ness. Readiness and mobility will obviously be among the highest
priorities. NATO-related sealift would be put into the category
of forces that could be reconstituted, including purchased or
otherwise acquired from the civilian market, during the two years
that future program planning now assumes is available.
The ability to respond to a major unforeseen threat will,
apparently, also be met with the assumption that there will be
two years warning in which lift can be reconstituted. In such a
climate, it will be hard to justify the retention of older, World
War II-era ships, as a part of the National Defense Reserve
Fleet. It is likely that shipyards, also justified to repair
battle-damaged fleet assets, may also be part of the defense
industrial base to be reconstituted instead of maintained.
11
Although not specifically addressed by the Administration,
it seems obvious that the U.S. will also devise a peacetime
strategy to deal with low intensity conflict. Such struggles
threaten international stability. A dynamic strategy to promote
democracy, justice, free enterprise, economic growth, and to
counteract terrorism, subversion, insurgencies, and narcotics
trafficking can be accomplished primarily by security assistance
programs as well as other instruments of U.S. national power.
From this cursory initial look at the Chairman's recommended
force based on strategic assumptions apparently approved by the
President, it appears that the U.S. Navy will change the least.
While in Moscow in October, Secretary Cheney spoke of a 450-ship
Navy. The Navy appears to have accepted a twelve-deployable
carrier fleet but it is very likely that some programs for new
weapons systems are in jeopardy.
In his speeches in August, General Powell supported reten-
tion of the strongest possible Navy. This does not mean that
the United States will adopt a national maritime strategic out-
look, positing heavy reliance on maritime forces to the exclusion
of others, since the sea services can contribute to attaining
political goals, but they cannot achieve them all. A maritime
heavy force structure might reopen old debates between maritime
and continental strategies, but the Navy should recall that it
forms but one component of triadic forces that ensure U.S. na-
tional security strategy. The Maritime Strategy will devolve
12
into separate programming and war fightiig strategies - thus
further complicating the debate.
The Soviet Threat
Underlying any reexamination of America's role in the world
and its basic national security strategy are the monumental
changes in the international security environment in the past few
years. Strategies are designed to cope with implied or explicit
threats; the profound changes in the threat, therefore, have a
direct bearing on the strategies that the U.S. and NATO need and
will develop. Rather than enumerate the revolutionary events we
have witnessed, it seems appropriate to first analyze the impact
of these changes on the Soviet C-in-C of the Western Theater of
Strategic Military Actions (TVD)
.
NATO is aware of the capability of Soviet hardware, military
exercises and deployment, and military-technical aspects of
military doctrine as indications of a real strategy and capabili-
ty for offensive warfare by the Western TVD Commander. Employing
this offensive capability was termed, by the Soviets, a theater
strategic military operation. The theater strategic operation we
believed the Soviets capable of today strongly resembled the
Manchurian Operation they fought against Japan near the end of
World War II. In the Western TVD, initial offensive military
operations by a front were assumed to achieve rates of advance of
40-60 kilometers per day to a depth of 600-800 kilometers. 22 The
duration of a normal frontal operation was about 15-20 days,
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meaning that overall, two fronts should have handled all of
Western Europe in about 25-30 days. NATO took this threat seri-
ously and prepared its own forces and counterstrategy according-
ly.
It is not clear that the Soviets ever saw themselves as
fierce warriors as the West did. They had a much clearer picture
of deficiencies in the military-industrial sector that have just
now become apparent to the West. They recognized the problems
they would have if they attempted a theater-wide military opera-
tion with multiple fronts while trying to attain their strategic
objectives in a simultaneous surge effort. It is doubtful that
they felt capable of managing such a theater offensive using
sequential operations
.
With the nagging self-doubt in their ability to manage a
theater strategic military operation before the sweeping politi-
cal changes in Europe, the problems are infinitely more compli-
cated given the reunification of Germany and the imminent with-
drawal of Soviet forces from Germany and the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic. Even if Soviet forces remain in Poland for a
few years, the Western TVD C-in-C cannot count on Warsaw Pact
nations committing their armed forces to Soviet command. Indeed
the Western TVD C-in-C probably assumes that Eastern European
military forces would oppose a Soviet forced reentry.
The Western TVD C-in-C cannot advise his political leader-
ship that, under current or likely future conditions, it is
14
possible to launch offensive military operations at the theater
strategic level, against non-Soviet Europe with any degree of
confidence of successfully completing his assigned mission. The
Western TVD C-in-C is probably driving his staff to develop new
plans for the forced and opposed reentry into Eastern Europe from
the Soviet homeland.
These assumptions dovetail remarkably with the declaratory
Soviet military doctrine and strategy evidence that we observed
in the past few years. We have seen Soviet deeds belie Soviet
words, when they often spoke of a defensive doctrine but clearly
maintained forces for an offensive strategy. The Soviet Union is
moving towards positioning all its ground forces within its bor-
ders, absorbing the first blow from an adversary, then having the
capability and military strategy to repel an invasion to the
Soviet border but not cross and continue the counteroffensive in
enemy territory. 24
It appears that the traditional strategic missions of the
Soviet Armed Forces and the criteria for successful completion of
those missions, have undergone significant revision. Formerly,
total defeat of the enemy's armed forces in an armed conflict was
demanded as the military's contribution to the overall war ef-
fort. Under the new defensive doctrine, the revised military
requirement is to defeat the invading force and to prevent verti-
cal and horizontal escalation, or the escalation of the conflict
over time.
15
The political/ideological goal of traditional Soviet war
termination strategy was to ensure that the aggressor could not
again threaten the USSR, and that progress was made toward even-
tual peace ("mir" ) and a world socialist order. The political
goals for war termination are now to prevent nuclear holocaust
and simultaneously ensure the survival of the homeland (socialist
or other)
.
We are receiving numerous clear signals about "new thinking"
in the USSR. Army General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, Chief of the USSR
Armed Forces General Staff and USSR First Deputy Defense Minis-
ter, announced, in November 1990, a series of significant mili-
tary reforms that parallel actions being taken by the U.S., NATO,
and the general European community of nations. The first stage
of this reform will last until 1994 and will consist of the
complete redeployment and resettlement of Soviet troops based on
foreign soil. The second stage (1994-1995) will consist of the
formulation of strategic groupings of armed forces on Soviet
territory with a new system for training and mobilization.
The third stage will last from 1996-2000. In this stage,
further reductions, reorganizations, and reequipping of forces
will take place. By the year 2000, according to Moiseyev, strate-
gic nuclear forces will be cut 50%, ground forces by 10-12%, air
defense forces by 18-20%, air forces by 6-8%, and administrative,
research, and other combat forces by 3 0%. The number of generals
to be cut is 1,300, officers - 220,000, and warrant officers and
16
ensigns - 250,000. The overall armed forces will number 3-3.2
million personnel.
Perhaps the most startling signals about "new thinking" is
the proposal contained in the Soviet literature in August 1990
that the Armed Forces of the USSR restructure themselves into
three basic contingents, which show a remarkable resemblance to
President Bush's and General Powell's strategy and forces struc-
ture. The USSR appears to be discussing its own version of an
active, reserve, and reconstitutable force strategy and base
force.
The first contingent, in this new Soviet proposal, would
comprise forces in a state of permanent high combat readiness.
It would consist, in part, of new military services called the
Nuclear Forces and Space Forces. The Nuclear Forces would com-
prehend the existing Strategic Rocket Forces, as well as appro-
priate units from the Air Force and the Navy. Space Forces would
include existing Air Defense and Antisatellite Forces. These new
services would remain under the direct control of the Supreme
High Command.
The first contingent would also consist of highly mobile
Ground Forces, whose strength and composition could change de-
pending upon the international political-military situation and
the economic potential of the USSR. This force size would be
sufficient to resolve a conflict in an individual region until
relieved by forces of the second contingent. It does not appear
17
capable of offensive military operations at a theater strategic
level. Initial estinates are a force of around 1.2-1.3 million
servicemen allocated between the Ground Forces, Air Force, Air
Defense and Space Defense Forces, and the Navy. Command and
control would remain with the High Command of Forces in the TVDs.
The second contingent, according to this proposal, would
consist of an additional 630,000-man reserve force. Up to one-
third the first contingent would form the nucleus of the second
contingent. Hardware and weapons for these reserves would be
stored at depots and bases. This contingent would form the large
strategic formations necessary for major military operations in a
war. It could probably mount an offensive theater strategic
military operation -- but before it was organized, strategic
warning would be provided.
The third contingent would embrace, in part, some 300,000 -
350,000 additional men undergoing between five and six months
training for national service. The men would then serve for an
additional five-six months with either first and second contin-
gent forces, or a longer period in newly organized republican
units, probably similar to the U.S National Guard. Call-up will
take place twice a year. These forces would augment troops in
the field should war erupt. A second part of the third contin-
gent would consist of these new republican units. The total
strength of the third contingent would be some 600,000 - 700,000
servicemen.
18
This proposal for the reorganization 03 the Soviet military
is but a proposal in a continuing internal debate over the pro-
gramming for new forces. The debate is not over and may be imma-
terial to a discussion of the problems of current war planning
guidance. Except to the extent that debates over future forces
give us insights on current thinking, many military leaders today
retain their "old thinking" from the days that they were first
socialized into the Army and it is this type of thinking that we
also would have to face if there was a war today.
The message for the West, however, is that if reorganization
plans like this are implemented, and reductions in military
capability include strategic nuclear and naval forces in the
future, then Gorbachev's promise to take away the threat has come
true. We must now deal with the guestions stemming from "what if
peace?"
Issues For Discussion
The issues raised in the President's Aspen speech are numer-
ous, complex, and require discussion. Some of the more important
include: how likely is the new strategy to take hold; how do we
define our new goals and objectives for both program and war
planning; what is the lasting impact of our current contingency
operations in the Middle East; what are the new requirements for
the intelligence community, for decision-making, investment
strategy, personnel and organizations, for technology, and the
transition period? This section will respond to these obvious
questions and perhaps suggest what else might be included.
19
Is the New Strategy Real?
It may be instructive to review another Presidential unveil-
ing of a major programming strategy to see if there are paral-
lels. When President Ronald Reagan announced, in March 1983, 28
his concept for a strategic defense initiative (SDI) , he ex-
plained how the U.S. and its allies planned to defended them-
selves from an attack by Soviet intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles (ICBMs). That strategy would be possible only if the
Congress would purchase the weapons systems associated with SDI.
It would have been wrong to assume that current U.S. or NATO
strategy was immediately changed to defend the U.S. against
ICBMs, since neither the U.S. nor its allies had defensive
forces in being which could engage such missiles.
Just as in 1990, there transpired a series of briefings and
speeches in 1983 by supporting officials following the Presi-
dent's vision of a new defense doctrine. Then-Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger delivered a major speech explaining the
basic concept. A Blue-Ribbon panel of experts was commissioned
to study the possible applications of technology to the strate-
gy and initial results of their deliberations began leaking to
the public in late 1983. Not until the programming documents
were delivered to Congress in February 1984 did the strategy for
defense of homeland and allies under SDI begin to be fleshed out
in official documents. Indeed, strategic defenses in the
previous set of programming documents provided no hint that a new
initiative was being contemplated.
20
Unlike the 1990 case, in 1983 the civilian academic communi-
ty appeared to mobilize almost instantaneoi sly and publish both
supporting and critical assessments of the new doctrine, mostly
Op-Ed pieces. It was months later that the public saw more
comprehensive treatments of the strategy and associated technolo-
gies. There was widespread interest in the technologies associ-
ated with SDI, primarily because of the opportunities for pro-
curement business with the government and opportunities to work
at the vanguard of knowledge. What is less well recognized,
however, was the great deal of "study money" used to flesh out
the strategic concepts.
We should assume that President Bush's Aspen speech will
likewise lead to substantial "study money" being used to flesh
out the concepts he discussed. What remains to be seen is wheth-
er the studies will be completed before 1991 budget actions or
faster than significant international events unfold. Recent
events in Saudi Arabia sidetracked a great deal of internal
examination of the new strategy and the expected critical evalua-
tion from those outside government.
Under the American form of government, the announcement of a
policy by the Administration is not an announcement of government
policy. Indeed, SDI, although feared and attacked by the Soviet
Union, and probably the cause for major decisions in the Soviet
budget, never developed beyond the stage of an initiative, and
full-scale evolution or deployment may not yet be feasible.
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Both candidates George Bush and Michael Dukakis appeared to
embrace the "competitive strategies initiative" during the last
presidential campaign. The Annual Report to the Congress by the
Secretary of Defense included sections devoted to competitive
strategies in Fiscal Years 1987, 1988, and 1989. Competitive
strategies also appear in the 1987 edition of the President's
National Security Strategy of the United States and in the
United States Military Posture FY 1988 . prepared by the Joint
Staff. Competitive strategies, still an initiative, has never
attained full policy status of the Executive branch of govern-
ment.
In short, before any new initiative becomes a funded govern-
ment policy, vested domestic interests and America's allies will
have opportunities to make their desires known. Parliamentary
governments, common among our NATO allies, may have some advan-
tage in completing a comprehensive review of strategy and redi-
rection of defense programs. Hence, it may be easier for NATO
nations to respond to this U.S. initiative and international
events than it will for the U.S. to take action.
Defining Goals & Objectives in Programming &. War Planning
A good example of the verities of parliamentary forms of
government, compared to the American government, in making major
defense policy changes is the review of the master strategy for
Australian defense forces conducted from 1985-1987. In February
1985, the Australian Minister of Defense, Kim Beazley, employed
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noted str itegist Paul Dibb to examine the c irrent capabilities of
the Australian Defense Force, describe the current strategic
environment, set defense priorities and strategy, and define the
appropriate future force structure.
Dibb issued his report in March 1986 and, after a sufficient
period for analysis and criticism, the government issued its own
version in March 1987. 33 Concepts first outlined by Dibb were
adopted by the Australian government, after a serious but brief
(by American standards) debate and adjustment. They were then
carried out by the Ministry of Defense and the Australian Defense
Forces. Such a relatively orderly process seldom occurs in the
United States, and we should not expect debate over the Presi-
dent's new strategy to remain either bloodless or limited to
American domestic political actors.
Political-military strategic planning generally commences
with: (1) , a tabulation of the resources likely to be available,
or (2) , an assessment of the threat, or (3) , an examination of
the goals and objectives to be attained. The planning process
can start with any of these three factors but it generally does
start with different ones depending upon the type of planning
underway
.
For example, in wartime, planning often starts with a tabu-
lation of the resources available - probably how we started the
process on December 8, 1941. Yet, nations may turn first to an
examination of the threat in wartime, when faced with the need to
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create major strategic plans insufficiently researched before the
war. The USSR likely did this after Jun » 22, 1941. In each
case, the possible goals and objectives were limited by the
resources available and the threat.
War planning may also start with an examination, analysis,
and reconsideration of goals and objectives. The U.S. and the
Soviet Union each had initial goals and objectives they attempted
to achieve in the initial stages of World War II. Later, howev-
er, the allies amassed sufficient forces to operate on the
strategic offensive in all theaters and recognized that "uncondi-
tional surrender" was a possible goal. Hence goals and objec-
tives can and often do change during wars.
Much of the literature devoted to defense planning, however,
does not concern actual war planning, but rather program plan-
ning, used to explain to legislators and the public why certain
types of weapons systems and forces should be purchased and
maintained. Programming strategy under the Planning, Program-
ming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) , in the United States, offi-
cially starts with an examination and identification of the
threat. There have always been implicit unofficial discussions
of the range of resources available that may have preceded this
threat examination. In general, a fundamental reexamination of
goals and objectives has not been necessary in the recent program
planning for defense.
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There is often some simi Larity between war planning and
program planning, but there may be fundamental differences. For
example, the USS MIDWAY was justified in 1940s programming plans
to help defeat Japan. War plans in the 1980s included the USS
MIDWAY defending Japan. President Bush's remarks in Aspen are
programming remarks and do not reflect changes in the current
defense plans for the U.S. or U.S. forces which would fight today
under NATO.
It was reported in the NATO London Declaration and in Gener-
al Galvin's DPC remarks that a new NATO strategy (probably iden-
tified as MC-14/4) is being drafted - paralleling unilateral
programming actions being undertaken by individual NATO nations.
Both actions are necessary, national programming planning to deal
with the force requirements for the future, and NATO war planning
to deal with actual forces and today's threats. Initially, there
will be significant differences between the strategies articulat-
ed for each case.
The new NATO strategy will be based upon paragraph 2 of the
London Declaration. NATO strategy will likely have peacetime,
crisis, and wartime responses. Peacetime elements will likely
include: enumeration of national prerogatives, maintenance of
alliance cohesion by integration and multinational forces, intel-
ligence and verification of arms control agreements, forward
presence, active and reserve forces training, force generation
preparation, and interaction with non-NATO forces.
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The crisis response strategy will likely address: readiness
for the Rapid Reaction Corps, the quick reaction of the alliance
to emerging crises, communication with adversaries, planned
sharing of risks and burdens, escalation and deescalation, and
the preparation for controlled mobilization and demobilization.
New political realities require an enhanced political component
to crises that erupt in the NATO area. For example, the initial
reaction to a crisis in the former German Democratic Republic
would deploy NATO troops into the area formerly protected by the
Warsaw Pact, yet avoid contact with remaining Soviet troops. The
political goal of a future crisis appears to be - control and
deescalate.
The U.S. and NATO never had the opportunity to develop war
plans for an environment that included forces envisaged under
President Reagan's SDI. For President Bush's new strategy, there
is no need to delay immediate revisions of war plans for existing
forces. There are significant changes to the international
environment, especially the threat, and an immediate need to
reduce defense expenditures - hence plans can be changed now.
This specifically includes our desire and ability to change now
the planned employment of strategic nuclear and conventional
forces.
Do we need to target facilities and forces in nations that
clearly are no longer enemies? It is a fair assumption that we
formerly targeted Soviet nuclear forces deployed in Eastern
Europe. Presumably, we have technical ways to preclude nuclear
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warheads from exploding in the former Germa i Democratic Republic
now that this territory is part of a NATO member nation. But
have we applied common sense to the nuclear targeting of other
national areas? What political benefit would be gained from
targeting areas where restless nationalities are already strug-
gling against the national government in the USSR? Can we change
our targeting fast enough to respond to rapidly changing politi-
cal events? Do we have to render inoperative warheads in mis-
siles with multiple warheads to both meet our objectives of
destroying military targets yet avoiding collateral damage?
Similarly, in the conventional realm, there is an obvious
need to immediately revise existing war plans since NATO now
controls both sides of the Fulda Gap. Indeed, General Galvin
told the DPC that "it is clear that the old General Defense Plan
is useless, and I have already rescinded it." NATO has now been
asked to respond to a request for assistance in the defense of a
member nation, Turkey, from a non-Warsaw Pact threat. Did plans
for such a contingency exist? There are obvious components to
conventional war planning that should be revisited and need not
await programming decisions.
Conventional war planning in the United States, unlike
nuclear war planning, has generally been done by professional
military forces, without significant direct civilian
involvement. The Chairman of the JCS should reconsider this
situation and seek active interaction with the civilian community
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to make meaningful contributions and immediate changes to conven-
tional war planning.
Specifically, strategists, political scientists, area stud-
ies specialists, economists, etc., probably can all provide
immediate assistance and advice to the military to adjust current
war plans. The military has traditionally been able to perform
this task in-house, but with the phenomenal changes in the inter-
national security environment and the preoccupation of the bu-
reaucracy with Operation Desert Shield, assistance from the "out-
side" may be required.
If left to their own devices, it is possible that the bu-
reaucracy will be tempted to ensure that current war plans sup-
port planned future programs and the existing organizational
structure. Many civilian "outsiders" that could help are the
numerous government employee faculty members at the war colleges,
service academies, research laboratories, and similar institu-
tions. These individuals are not from "outside" the government
and many have security clearances and a great deal of expertise.
The Chairman of the JCS already recognizes that a revolution
has occurred in the international security environment. This
requires the immediate transfusion of expertise from the civilian
community to the military. We cannot afford the luxury of wait-
ing for new officers who have recently studied these affairs, to
cycle through the graduate education and War College processes;
nor is the contracting and consulting community the government's
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best source for new ideas. This involvement by civilians in
military affairs already occurs with nuclear program and war
planning, and general forces program planning. Although previous
proposals for such involvement from individuals within the Penta-
gon have been made before, 36 they have always been defeated.
NATO nations also should involve their civilian academic
communities with military planners, and it is my experience that
other armed forces are more comfortable with this model than is
the American (or Soviet) military. This is not the time to draw
distinctions between who should be involved in the debate over
fundamental goals and objectives. In World War II, the U.S. and
allied armed services drafted, or otherwise secured, the services
of academics who had years of area experience that the military
lacked. What is going on in the world has not been seen by the
existing bureaucracy. The time to repeat the involvement of
outsiders is now.
An alternative model would be for the military services to
allow or invite the political leaders of their nations to dictate
the revised goals and objectives. While there are some political
leaders and a great many advisors available to intelligently
discuss and decide nuclear strategy issues, most civilian leaders
lack the requisite background in conventional warfare to know
what is possible and what is not. The military services perspec-
tive is that the services must participate in the debate. The
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services should also involve civilian specialists in areas from
which they have traditionally been left out.
Current Contingency Operations
A decade ago, when the U.S. initially prepared contingency
plans for its Rapid Deployment Force, many observers feared that
the deployment of significant military forces to the Middle East
would move forces simultaneously committed to the defense of
Europe. War planners feared an outbreak of hostilities in the
Western TVD at the same time U.S. forces were arriving in South-
west Asia. That nightmare would tax America's capability to
redeploy forces, or deploy forces remaining in North America, to
Europe in time to influence the war. Despite 250,000 personnel
currently in Southwest Asia, and another 100,000+ en route, there
has been a dearth of commentary from Europeans worried about this
issue.
If we can afford to place more combat troops in the Middle
East by early 1991 than we had in Europe at the height of the
Cold War, should we not assume that European NATO nations have
accepted the diminution of those forces in Europe to deter a war
today? Unknown is whether U.S. forces being moved from Europe to
the Middle East will ever return to Europe, or upon completion of
Operation Desert Shield, go home to the United States.
If the equipment being sent to the Middle East is brought
back to the U.S., is it stored in sealift ships quickly deploy-
able to a future crisis or is it given to the reserves? If the
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size of the reserves really goes down as a result of the new
strategy , what do we do with the excess eq lipment? If the per-
sonnel in the Middle East return to the U..3. to be demobilized,
do we leave their equipment prepositioned in Saudi Arabia or
offshore in ships or do we bring all of it back as well?
The current Middle East crisis demonstrates that the U.S.
can muster sufficient assets from the continental U.S. to meet a
major contingency where there were no forces in being. It also
seems to demonstrate that such a force does not require basing
overseas, such as in Europe. 37 It will take the resolution of
this crisis to make a definitive statement on the issue — but we
should review the President's new strategy and the associated
force structure after Operation Desert Shield has run its course.
Once Desert Shield after action reports are written, ana-
lysts will try to answer the question what systems appeared to
make a difference in the political and military outcome. Systems
that did not make a major contribution to this contingency opera-
tion will need to be reevaluated for upgrading or cancellation
and replacement. Under the new strategy to reconstitute capabil-
ities useful in a Europe-centered global war with the USSR, there
will be no need to retain systems that do not have a dual use in
the Contingency Force.
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New Requirements for Intelligence
The changes suggested by the Bush Administration, if accept-
ed by the U.S. Congress, will place an enormous burden on the
intelligence community. Although one might argue that logically,
concomitant with such fundamental changes intelligence appropria-
tions should increase, it is probable that they will decrease
like defense spending.
The bulk of the U.S. and NATO national intelligence communi-
ties are oriented toward understanding and countering the Soviet
threat. Although it took many years, the West eventually grew
sophisticated at understanding the Soviet perspective on doc-
trine, strategy, arms control, and the like. Our intelligence
agencies and associated policy offices are substantially less
competent at analyzing, predicting behavior, and conducting net
assessments for the rest of the world. In order to reconstitute
forces for a major war, we will need two-years warning of a major
unforeseen threat as well. Deficiencies in this area should be
corrected, and quickly. Flexibility in shifting intelligence
assets from one set of collection targets to rapidly emerging
priority targets is essential to support the contingency response
element of the President's strategy.
The U.S. possesses an excellent intelligence community which
will need fine tuning and some redirection but is capable of
providing the government with all of the necessary assessments.
To involve the intelligence community with additional tasking in
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economic analysis will challenge that community, and it should be
done with the full cooperation of existing organizations outside
of government. Formerly, when intelligence analysts differed,
the debate could be settled by an assessment of the data. With
political and economic intelligence, it is often the methodology
rather than the data that settles disputes. 38
We have to build capabilities to match our stated need for
new types of information. Economic and other forms of strategic
intelligence, for example, may become relatively more important
than extremely costly technical intelligence systems designed to
provide tactical warning. It is important to recognize that, in
addition to the obvious burden of providing two years strategic
warning of a Europe-centered global war with the USSR, and much
faster warning of crises outside of Europe, the intelligence
community should undergo a fundamental reexamination of its
missions and priorities.
Requirements for Decision-Making
NATO talked in terms of a few days warning (the time to
detect an invasion) and another few days for decision. Mobiliza-
tion and return of initial American troops and air forces from
the continental U.S. to Europe would take around 10 days. Hence
the canonical 14 -day scenario arose, with enormous effort devoted
to the assessment of theater-strategic operations and campaigns
that would be fought by forces that could be brought to bear. We
became very adept at calculating theater-wide force ratios for
the first thirty or forty-five days of a war in Europe. The
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question arises: how long would it take the Soviets to again be
in such a position to cause the U.S. to worry about a European
crisis that could escalate to warfare and perhaps be over within
a month and a half?
From the New York Times report, it appears that the U.S. has
accepted the answer, "as long as two years." 9 What we need to
more fully establish is exactly what this two years means?
Should we assume that we will have two years to reconstitute
forces from the time that strategic warning is provided and
accepted by the intelligence community? Which intelligence
community? Is it two years following government's accepting that
something is wrong that needs to be redressed? Which government
or governments and does NATO collectively have to agree to react?
Is it two years assuming that we can find something significant
and recognize it at the time?
Two years does not mean that the USSR cannot launch an
intercontinental nuclear strike against the continental U.S.,
or an attack at the operational level on Europe or at the tacti-
cal level in Europe in less time than that. But, for programming
purposes (procuring weapons in Fiscal Years 1992-1997), U.S. and
other NATO national planners should assume that the old theater
strategic operation, or a surge attack across the old inter-
German border with the Pyrenees as goal, could not be mounted
without the U.S. intelligence community obtaining and understand-
ing indicators two years in advance.
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Since the threat of Soviet invasion of central Europe today
is remote, U.S. programming planners may assume that they will
have sufficient warning to re-build much of the forces and mate-
rial instead of maintaining them on active duty, in the Ready Re-
serves, or prepositioned. Succinctly, the need for the old,
massive, short-term (14-day) mobilization has diminished. The
threat planning assumption that once drove NATO toward a two-week
mobilization requirement has been replaced with a threat that now
gives the alliance two years to respond.
War planners, unlike program planners, are not required to
use "best case" assumptions and are therefore authorized to
formulate their plans on less optimistic suppositions. Hence,
redirection of programming planners to the "best case" (two years
warning) does not deny governmental decision-makers access to
alternative intelligence assessments nor does it necessarily
influence war planning for current forces.
Even accepting the ability of the intelligence community to
provide a two years strategic warning, there is controversy over
what governments will do when faced with the inconclusive evi-
dence provided initially. If Western history of non-reactions to
rearmament by totalitarian nations and violations of arms control
agreements is a guide, we should assume that democracies will:
(1) , delay decisions to rearm for many good reasons - such as
different interpretations of ambiguous intelligence data, the
desire to deescalate a crisis, etc., (2), deny that a change in
the behavior of a former opponent has taken place or, if it has,
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is not strategically significant or not precisely a violation of
an agreement, and (3) , even suppress the intelligence and find-
ings of facts that do not support government policy.
A major lesson from previous arms control agreements is that
they not only limit necessary preparation for deterrence, but
also deter democracies from exposing totalitarian nations openly
violating such agreements. During the inter-war period, Germany,
Italy and Japan built many warships exceeding limits set forth in
arms control and other treaties, clear violations actively hidden
by at least one major democracy. For example, Britain had an
Italian cruiser in its Gibraltar drydock, weighed it, found it in
excess of the 10,000 ton treaty limit, and hid its findings. 41
In yet another case, the Admiralty continued to record the incor-
rect but treaty-compliant tonnage for the German battleship
BISMARK, even after it was sunk and the Royal Navy's Intelligence
Division had examined the ship's logs and surviving crew. 2
Linking the behavior of a nation to a formal agreement, such
as arms control, takes the reporting and interpretation of data
away from the intelligence community and makes it the province of
lawyers and politicians. For years, these individuals debated
whether or not a Soviet radar was in compliance with the ABM
Treaty, despite no apparent change in the data provided by the
intelligence community. In the end, the Soviets themselves admit-
ted that the radar was a violation. Had this radar not been
linked to an arms control treaty, it is very likely that the
36
assessment of its in1 ended purpose would \ ave been the routine
province of professionals.
Governments should have an integrated defense and arms
control agenda. We are currently engaged, or will likely soon
engage, in arms control negotiations or unilateral steps in lieu
of arms control in virtually every warfare area. Decision-makers
should not allow the desire of advocates or negotiators, or one
branch of the bureaucracy, or the recommendations of one nation
in an alliance, to dominate the debate over the value of a poten-
tial arms control agreement. Arms control should only be engaged
in if it can be demonstrated that the agreement will contribute
to the defense of the United States, the decreased likelihood of
war, the reduced consequences of war if one were to nevertheless
break out, or a concurrent reduction in costs. Decision-makers
will need to ensure that a comprehensive review of the value of
individual agreements is performed.
We will need to make a study of the decision-making patterns
of nations when faced with decisions similar to one that NATO
governments will face when presented with ambiguous evidence
which, some might argue, constitutes "proof" that the USSR, or
the Russian Republic in a new USSR confederation, is violating
the "understandings" or treaties that codify the new security
environment. The military should include in their family of war
plans, plans based upon the track record of their governments
acting courageously in response to provocation.
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Decision-making studies should span the gamut of possible
scenarios. At one end of the spectrum is the "worst case," of
NATO reconstituting its forces within the two years predicted,
but withholding the authority to mobilize forces out of garrison
and respond to tactical warning until an attack by the USSR takes
place, is verified, reported to the national and allied command
authorities, and an authorization to respond is communicated to
the field. In this scenario, we assume that the Soviet military
machine was able to come back strong. A "best case" at this end
of the spectrum would be if all forces were allowed to report to
their NATO-assigned positions, ready for a stillborn Soviet
threat generated during two years of economic and political
chaos. Perhaps NATO might have an option for offensive tactical
and even operational-level warfare against the USSR.
At the other end of the spectrum is the other "worst case,"
of a USSR that takes a full two years to rearm in such a manner
that it obtains a significant advantage in its estimation of the
correlation of forces and means. The scenario would assume that
NATO nations failed to make bold decisions when faced with ambig-
uous evidence by the intelligence community. We should also look
at the case when both sides had fully reconstituted and assumed a
wartime command and control footing and deployment.
There are numerous other scenarios that need investigation.
Despite the lack of credibility accorded a "bolt-from-the-blue"
ground attack by the USSR during the new international security
environment, we should analyze this scenario to develop intelli-
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gence indicators we should monitor to ensure against such a
possibility.
We also have records of planning and studies over the old
scenarios of war that are not totally irrelevant. For example,
it is conceivable that Eastern European nations might ask Soviet,
or Russian, troops back into their nations to counteract what
they perceive to be a threat from Germany. That scenario can
build upon existing studies. Differences with today's scenarios
might include reconstitution at national locations but failure to
deploy forces from home garrisons and allow their transfer to
NATO. Other possibilities include using the Contingency Force to
respond to a European crisis.
War planners will also wrestle with how much time and what
type of decisions are necessary during the initial combat actions
in a crisis, before forces are either called up from the reserves
or reconstituted in full. During this period, presumably both
superpowers would act defensively.
In a November 1989 interview, Marshal of the Soviet Union
Sergei F. Akhromeyev, military advisor to the current Chairman of
the Supreme Soviet, stated some very specific views on how long
this defensive period would last. He implied that the role of the
defensive, during the initial period of a future war, was to
allow the political leadership the opportunity to terminate the
crisis before it erupted into a major armed conflict and war. If
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the political leadership failed, Akhromeyev implied that the
military would be then be unleashed to perform their normal func-
tion of crushing and decisively routing the enemy. 43
A previous debate within the framework of Soviet military
science covering the initial period of a war that may prove
instructive to the possibility of the threat today. During 1922
- 1941, questions arose regarding how long border skirmishes and
diplomatic exchanges would last prior to total mobilization.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Grigori Zhukov gives the interval in
his memoirs as "several days" while Marshal of the Soviet Union
Vasiley D. Sokolovskiy writes in his Military Strategy that the
initial period might have lasted 15-20 days. 44
NATO exercise and simulated military decision-making has
traditionally assumed that the alliance political structure would
make decisions, which would then be carried out by near-simulta-
neous actions taken by all member nations. In a restructured
NATO alliance that is more political than military, and exists in
a new international security environment, NATO and national mili-
tary commanders might have to make future plans based upon a
likely decision-making process that has member nations making
unilateral actions prior to those of the alliance as a whole.
This, in turn, would require the planning for more sequential
military operations, rather than simultaneous. Similarly, plan-
ning for allied, or combined forces, military operations may take
second place to national planning. Future military planning by
NATO may stress combined or joint operations but with forces
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under national command. All of these topics are currently being
discussed by the appropriate military commands.
These and other scenarios should be augmented with the most
sophisticated techniques available to learn lessons of wars and
campaigns yet to be fought. An artificial history could be writ-
ten of alternative futures so that the military can better advise
their political leadership on the most suitable courses of action
for decisions they should make today.
Technological Requirements ^
In the new political-military environment, the American
public is predictably less likely to sustain a major overseas
military presence or combat in foreign lands. Hence, require-
ments should be demanded for high technology weapons systems
using robotics and artificial intelligence so that if engaged in
combat, American casualties are minimized. America's smaller
armed forces should be provided with the most technologically ad-
vanced equipment.
Perhaps this is the time to revisit President Reagan's dream
of a defense-dominant world, but now, deployment of the Treaty-
compliant antiballistic missile system should be the first step.
Once there is a national consensus on the value of defenses, the




With the demise of the old NATO-Warsaw Pact scenario and the
prospect of numerous arms control agreements, the requirement for
some technologies may diminish. For example, if the Soviet Union
actually accepts mutual assured destruction, demonstrated by
their giving up strategic air and missile defenses, we may not
need to invest in countermeasures to penetrate those defenses and
attack strategic offensive forces. Similarly, if warhead numbers
are driven low enough, perhaps we can abandon the search for
increased accuracy. With NATO armies on both sides of the old
inter-German border, some of those systems necessary for AIRLAND
Battle should have lower priorities.
On the other hand, some of the technologies that were iden-
tified with NATO follow-on forces attack (FOFA) may be useful in
future out-of-area contingency operations. An integrated task
force made up of all the services might benefit from technologies
that were designed to conduct simultaneous operations over the
full breadth and depth of the battlefield. An unbiased review
of both technologies and systems associated with the AIRLAND
Battle and FOFA will need to ascertain which are appropriate
under the new strategy.
Technologies that were considered not as useful under the
former political and international security environment may be
more interesting in the new world. For example, with numerous
overseas bases, offshore basing technologies received just modest
interest. 47 With the possibility that many American forces may
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return to North America, the U.S. may want to more fully investi-
gate the capabilities of offshore basing concepts.
The U.S. government has previously identified key technolo-
gies that should be protected, and routinely tracks our relative
standing in these areas vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. We have
recently expanded our comparison of our technological standing to
include allied nations, developing countries, and Eastern Europe.
We could all benefit from a Presidential Blue-Ribbon Panel syn-
thesizing these key technologies to explicate and validate their
importance in the new political-military environment. Perhaps
many we thought critical can be downgraded. Still, if we are to
reconstitute a significant combat capability against a world-
class adversary, then perhaps we need to identify those technolo-
gies that we should protect.
Investment Strategy
The major implication of the two-year big war warning of a
Europe-centered global war with the USSR is that American pro-
gramming strategy will shift its focus to the threats presented
in other areas of the world. Until now, the unstated relation-
ship of the threat to programmed forces was, generally, that U.S.
forces would meet the challenge of the most demanding threat, the
USSR, and assume that they could also cope with lesser contingen-
cies. That basic assumption was generally not entirely true and
now will be essentially reversed: forces will be acquired to meet
the challenges of the more likely, less demanding, threats assum-
ing that they are useful against the more unlikely but greater
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threat posed by a Soviet Union that decides to rearm. This will
be a new planning assumption for America, new for its allies, and
somewhat impractical for the near term - or until we see substan-
tial changes in Soviet maritime and nuclear force structure to
match what we know are reductions in the ground and air forces.
Some of the military capability that America and her allies
need to retain should be contained in existing active duty and
ready reserve forces. On-hand equipment and supplies for those
ready forces is needed. Some of the equipment and supplies will
need to be stockpiled and prepositioned. Maritime prepositioning
offers flexibility that has recently been demonstrated in the
Middle East. However, not all of the materials for war need to be
readily available.
Implicit in the President's new strategy is the need for a
successful investment strategy capable of tooling-up for wartime
production within the assumed two years of warning. This capa-
bility will consist primarily of the knowledge, skills, and tools
to respond within the timelines now specified. This concept is
not new and we should review the history of planning assumptions
A R
and industry's ability to respond in the 1930s.
Considering the record of all nations in producing major
weapons systems, it seems obvious that a fundamental restructur-
ing of the procurement processes is also required. Industry
often sought or took the leading role in exploring technological
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opportunities and charged such research to overhead for ma jo.
programs. With the lumbers of major programs likely to be se-
verely reduced, a nev mechanism is required for basic research
and initial development. To change the leading role in military
R&D, governments will have to reverse a major downward spiral in
this category of spending. 9
Another possibility is to have government set up major
design bureaus and internalize R&D responsibility itself --
perhaps specializing in areas devoid of normal civilian spin-
offs. An alternative strategy is to continue those operations in
the private sector and provide hefty government funding. Perhaps
state and local governments can be persuaded to invest in R&D as
well. The objective is to retain technology capability in numer-
ous areas and the production capability in a few.
In any case, the output ought not be a family of senescent
designs aging on the shelf, but rather fully operational proto-
types which will normally never enter full scale development. In
some cases, limited production runs may be necessary to ensure
. . • • • ^ othat production experience is maintained. In most cases,
product improvement programs should be included in the prototype
program.
Such a prototypes development program should ensure that
both the capability of assembly is maintained and a dynamic R&D
program continues. This should satisfy policy planners require-
ments to regenerate forces within two years, if needed. Keeping
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multiple possible products on the shelf is also a good competi-
tive strategy that will force an enemy to match all possible
threats instead of just a few.
That programming environment will reguire a new understand-
ing of the partnership between government and industry. It will
reguire major changes in the charters of many R&D and programming
agencies to allow easier adaptation of commercial technologies
into the defense sector and the continued flow of defense tech-
nologies into the civilian world. It will also likely reguire
changing defense regulations to allow profits on R&D and proto-
types .
Making the two year response time a reality may also reguire
abandoning military design specifications (MILSPEC) in many
areas. We may have to acknowledge that, to meet the deadlines,
readily available commercial products may be substituted. For
areas that clearly reguire specifications, the old system should
be retained.
Fred Ikle, former Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) , was a
proponent of preprogrammed crisis budgets and industrial re-
sponses to bridge the gap between peacetime and wartime.
Industrial mobilization, instead of military mobilization or the
deployment of troops, might form the basis of an adeguate govern-
mental response to ambiguous warning indicators. Ikle proposed a
series of industrial alert conditions, similar to those found in
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the military, which would trigger specific actions. There is no
reason contracts cannot be let ahead of time and contingency
orders specified. It seems that a "graduated deterrence re-
sponse," the term used by General Butler, could well involve a
"graduated industrial response."
Although we can speak abstractly about having plans and
passing budgets ahead of the need to do so, economists must help
government ascertain how much money would be required to recon-
stitute the defense industry. If that money is earmarked for
other purposes, then financial planning should include tracking
sufficient governmental short-term money that can be quickly
diverted to defense -- if the reconstitution part of the new
strategy is to have teeth.
Industry and government should decide on a basic strategy
consonant with our ability to support a defense industrial base
and our investment in new technologies; and both must be comfort-
able with their new nonconfrontational roles. Government should
ensure that industry remains capable of retooling and delivering
military products within two years or less. The government
record of abandoning major production programs is a travesty, and
it is likely that unless consciously addressed, we will permit
the destruction of most capability. Notable examples include the
Apollo and Saturn 5 programs, where facilities, equipment, hard-
ware, stores, instrumentation, data files, test stands, etc. were
destroyed and all technical teams were dispersed.
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Many military contractors have been provided government-
owned equipment or have charged the development of facilities and
equipment to military contracts. If the federal government
wishes to have these facilities retained, mothballed, or perhaps
even improved, then it should provide incentives. Ownership of
government equipment can be transferred to industry, or manage-
ment of facilities can be turned over to government. If retained
by industry, federal, state, and local tax laws will need to be
revised to reduce or eliminate taxes on idle property and land.
Industry should continue operations, meanwhile, on projects
that have no direct defense application and maintain the exper-
tise necessary to produce military associated equipment within
specified time limits. Keeping this expertise will require
innovative measures — perhaps even joint government and private
repositories of knowledge at taxpayers expense. This requires
new and innovative approaches to intellectual property rights.
The Department of Defense has allowed defense contractors to
retain title rights for inventions while reserving the right of
license-free use. If we mix federal and private sector research,
we may have to allow federal employees to benefit from royalties
for work that is produced while on government time.
Technological competition with other nations will continue
despite the new international security environment. While there
has been a clear effort to limit the spread of technologies to
the Eastern-bloc, we will likely see wholesale changes in the
management of militarily significant commercial products through
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the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(COCOM) . Existing national legislation wi .1 require amendment,
and new legislation is clearly going to be required to deal with
the myriad of questions that will arise when former socialist
states apply for access to technologies once forbidden to them
for outdated ideological and military reasons. Governments will
have to fundamentally revise policies to transfer key technolo-
gies to certain nations for economic advantage, not military
balance of forces.
On the other hand, technologies available for what remains
of military competition could improve so dramatically in the next
few years that the fundamental nature of warfare may change.
Competition in military hardware may shift from the nuclear arena
to the non-nuclear. As non-nuclear weapons become more capable,
they may substitute for nuclear weapons at the tactical, opera-
tional, and even the strategic level. Hence nations will have to
retain their technological lead in certain key areas, including
some which did not require protection.
Technologies are not the only economic assets whose protec-
tion has been justified in terms of the military. Our National
Defense Stockpile is supposed to provide the U.S. with guaranteed
access to critical strategic minerals for three years. We
feared both disruption during a long war with the USSR and lack
of access during the so-called "resources war" that never oc-
curred. Interestingly, although we can claim that critical compo-
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nents should also have been stockpiled, o such program ever
existed.
Our National Defense Stockpile of strategic minerals had its
genesis well prior to the Cold War, but can it be justified for
sound economic reasons? Other nations, like Japan, Sweden, and
Switzerland, maintain similar reserves for economic reasons but,
some years ago, a major study of the goals and objectives of our
stockpile concluded that a less costly option to ensure access to
materials included international development agencies, diplomatic
efforts to ensure stability of major minerals producers, without
significant budgetary costs. 52
Perhaps why we maintained such reserves had more to do with
domestic politics than true defense needs. In any case, the
entire program should be revisited and one of the options should
be a carefully controlled sale of major portions of the stockpile
to reduce the federal deficit.
The U.S. strategic petroleum reserves have been justified
for economic rather than military reasons. On the other hand,
the Rapid Deployment Force and numerous military programs have
also been justified to ensure America's access to oil. Given
competing needs for tax dollars, it seems a prudent planning
assumption that the Congress may not fund both a refill of the
petroleum reserve and General Powell's Contingency Force to
ensure we have access to oil.
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It seems equally appropriate to reviev the goals and objec-
tives of our means that provide sufficient quantities of oil —
but to only fund one. If we had a reserve capable of supplying
all economic and military needs for one or two years, instead of
the current unmet goal of 90 days, would we also have time to
reconstitute a Contingency Force? If our oil reserves were this
high, would we have intervened in Kuwait?
Personnel and Organizations
If changes of this magnitude persist, it would seem obvious
that the Department of Defense is going to undergo another soul-
wrenching roles-and-missions reappraisal. It will be appropriate
to revisit the existing wartime command and control structure for
C-in-Cs, and equally appropriate to review service roles and
missions. With reductions in force structure should come a loss
of organizational influence.
No matter how painful, the review of roles and missions will
occur, implicitly with budget decisions or explicitly if we dare.
Do we need warfighting C-in-Cs for the entire world if the U.S.
stops playing world policeman? Does the U.S. need a service
called the Marine Corps or do we need a contingency response
force? Should new services be created - such as space or special
operations forces? Should SACEUR automatically be an American?
These questions should all be answered.
The wholesale demobilization of military personnel into the
civilian job market has been accomplished in the United States,
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with mixed results. Appropriate temporary programs will be
needed to ensure that we manage the transition smoothly to sup-
port new national industrial and business goals.
We should not lose sight of the military goals and require-
ments to respond to crises with an active duty and reserve force
mix, as well as reconstitute additional forces within two years.
The draft will obviously be a low cost methods of managing the
necessary manpower pool but much more attention should be paid to
ensuring that the reserves can respond to crises, then return to
their disrupted civilian occupations without loss of families,
homes, and jobs. Existing legislation should be reviewed follow-
ing the completion of Operation Desert Shield.
More difficult will be the maintenance of a cadre of lead-
ers, and how they will obtain the necessary military leadership
training at appropriate levels of command, when there are fewer
forces to command? Schools are an obvious solution for the
officer corps and senior non-commissioned officers, but will the
services keep schools funded when faced with giving airmen flight
time or sailors actual time at sea? Service schools may have to
be consolidated for efficiency but perhaps there are even more
novel solutions.
If the officer corps is to be significantly reduced below
current levels, eventually a level is reached at which it is no
longer efficient to maintain military-run graduate schools, war
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colleges, and individual services flight training. A similar
problem exists with non-commissioned and warrant officers techni-
cal schools and government laboratories. Obvious suggestions to
consolidate Department of Defense facilities are already under
consideration but perhaps other government agencies might consol-
idate with defense. The Department of Energy maintains laborato-
ries, the Federal Aviation Agency has aviation facilities, inter
alia. Expanding the student body may even take the form of
training and education of military students from former socialist
nations -- attempting to provide them with both the technical
details and the framework for a military operating within a
democracy. 54
One possible solution, rather than consolidation or expand-
ing the student base, is an affiliation of defense schools and
laboratories with select civilian institutions, and the innova-
tion of mixed civilian-military educational and research institu-
tions that can be "reconstituted" to pure military or government
facilities within two years. We may not need large numbers of
officers and technical specialists trained during peace, but the
model for the reconstitution of industry might well be applied to
military training and education.
Another solution is to raise the level of basic research
being conducted at these institutions so that a substantive
faculty remains onboard and can shift to teaching duties when
required. Keeping technical warrant and non-commissioned offi-
cers active in research at industry, or mixed government-industry
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design bureaus, can Maintain the nucleus of a capability that may
be required on short notice. Similar arrangements can be made
with government graduate schools to increase their research and
still return quickly to teaching. These possible solutions beg
for a Presidential Blue-Ribbon panel to study the options and
make non-partisan recommendations.
In addition to these obvious personnel questions, what type
of individual should be involved in this major overhaul of the
defense planning assumptions. The military should provide indi-
viduals who can both represent service interests and Ccpabilities
and have an appreciation for the task at hand. This exercise
cannot be just another interagency meeting, with compromise
likely and one service holding the entire process hostage to
their threats or objections.
This review will have serious repercussions in existing
force structures and established plans for future forces. It is
going to hurt and will require officer participants willing to
put their allegiance to country ahead of combat arms or service
parochialism. These individuals exist in the peacetime services
and they generally are already networking outside of official
channels. 55 Perhaps we need to review our entire system for
training and educating weapons systems acquisition managers and
more fully integrate basic political science type issues that
were assumed constant in the past.
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Problems with the quality of existing DoD strategic planning
or politico-military personnel have been discussed frequently and
should have been solved by Goldwater-Nichols Act and two adminis-
trations committed to implement this legislation. The fundamen-
tal review of national military strategy will test this assump-
tion. The low level of public inter-service infighting over
Desert Shield indicates that there has been some success in this
area. Past problems occurred at all levels, with political ap-
pointees, within the services, or both.
Some political appointees have caused problems because of
their relative inexperience, high turnover rates, and lengthy
vacancies. The position of Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
during the Reagan Administration remained unfilled for an extend-
ed period following the resignation of Dr. Fred Ikle. Friction
between the experienced military and the relatively inexperienced
political appointee in the past will be exacerbated when those
political appointees preside over the wholesale dismantling of a
military machine that senior officers have spent their entire
careers building and defending.
Within service staffs, strategic planning billets have been
filled by individuals who lack the requisite education and desig-
nation as strategic planner. Some top-performing officers saw
their best interests served by a tour in procurement rather than
policy planning. Other top-performing officers, when assigned to
policy planning staffs, were often shuttled into key offices
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where they serve a brief first-experience generating tour before
returning to operational commands.
American social scientists can quickly provide rough answers
to approximations of how much can be devoted to defense, given
other needs. Political scientists inside and outside government
should work together on defining the new American international
goals and objectives required of programmed forces. The intelli-
gence community and civilian academics outside government should
rapidly provide assessments of threats to U.S. interests in areas
of the world traditionally relegated to official inattention.
The operations analysis and political science communities
will need to cooperate like they never have before. Military
operations analysis has previously concentrated on investigating
the possibilities afforded by the allocation of theater-wide
strategic conventional forces of around 1.5 enemy forces to 1
friendly forces within the old scenario of two weeks warning and
mobilization. This level of forces allowed the subsequent com-
mitment of around 3:1 at the operational (Soviet army) level and
the engagement of divisions and regiments at the 5:1 level.
The military operations analysis community needs to reorient
itself to measurements of reconstitution where the timelines are
measures in months and years and not days or weeks. Strategic
warning, decision making, non-NATO battlefields (ashore and at
sea) , manpower and personnel planning, resource allocation, test
and evaluation, combat models, and gaming and simulation are all
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areas that will need fundamental readjustment due to the new
international security environment.
The Transition Period
When President Reagan outlined his visions of a world with-
out nuclear ballistic missiles, or a defense dominated security
environment, it was necessary to look not only at those individu-
al scenarios but also to think through the painful transition
from the current state of affairs to the new one. For example,
what would the transition period have been like while we moved
from an offense-dominant world to one influenced primarily by de-
fenses? One scenario that should have been considered was a then-
potent USSR attempting to "prevent" deployment of strategic
defenses because of fear of the new security environment. After
looking at this scenario, the analysis should have yielded
conditions necessary to make the USSR secure during this transi-
tion stage.
A new security environment, based upon two years of strate-
gic warning, which includes the U.S., France, and perhaps the
U.K., no longer forward-deployed in Germany, may be so drastical-
ly different that we should assess the near-term or transition
risks from a less-than-controllable USSR under a spectrum of
potential "worst-case" scenarios. An obvious one is that the
Marshals and Generals seize power and the former Soviet military
threat returns within a few short months. Another variant is
that the unprecedented changes taking place in the USSR is merely
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"maskirovk \, " and what we see i:; a "breathing space" before the
Soviet mi] itary machine gears up when the economic crisis is
solved. This transition-era scenario may best be met with nucle-
ar weapons deployments and the Contingency Force.
As American and British ground troops withdraw from the
continent and French troops from Germany, naval and air force
nuclear weapons are substituted on a temporary basis. As Soviet
force levels are reduced to those agreed in the recently signed
CFE agreement, these nuclear forces can be easily withdrawn and,
of course, substituted as a "quick-fix" to offset unexpected
increases in the threat caused by a failure to properly interpret
warning indicators, or for other reasons.
Governments should become more refined at using means, other
than military forces, to influence the behavior of other nations.
New profound research on economic sanctions, for example, may be
necessary to evaluate how successful sanctions have been in the
past and as a supplement to Operation Desert Shield. Economic
tools will become even more difficult to use than in the past as
multi-national corporations become less responsive to national
governments
.
If these scenarios are not credible, there clearly are some
that can be devised. One technique for viewing alternative
futures toward a desired goal is that of path gaming. These are
political-military games that identify interesting alternative
paths and examines them simultaneously with different groups of
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players. Gaming, naturally, is no substitul e for solid analysis.
Gaming, however, can provide new insight ind supplements more
traditional methods of dealing with alternative futures. Perhaps
the time has come to jointly game with the USSR the deescalation
CO
of crises.
There will obviously be a fundamental restructuring of the
near-term programming already contracted, and there may be ex-
traordinarily high penalties paid as industries move from the
defense area to others. Programs such as the B-2 and A-12 ad-
vanced technology aircraft, the SSN-21 SEAWOLF submarine, and
others tied to the AIRLAND Battle would appear related to an
international security environment that no longer exists. 60 There
will be last-ditch attempts to salvage certain programs, 61 to
keep people employed, and legislative districts satisfied, and
this will be a great challenge to the new Congress -- which
should play its larger role instead of narrow constituent inter-
ests.
An obvious next step for the Department of Defense is to
provide incentives for the services to cease attempting to rejus-
tify old programs under the new strategy but to actually do a
zero-based needs assessment. An obvious second step is to plan
for the divestiture of unnecessary forces, equipment and indus-
trial capability.
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Some industrial and military facilities inevitably will be
idled and made obsolete. We can anticipate massive environmental
cleanups at particularly dirty facilities, such as industrial
sites used for the manufacture of weapons grade plutonium. The
staggering costs of these efforts will make them economically
unattractive for private peaceful use. Clearly, the government
will have to assume the burden of these costs.
Implicit in the reconstitution portion of the new strategy
is the retention of capability to produce eguipment and supplies
that have not been maintained. Not all firms will have to con-
vert, nor should they be allowed to convert to the civilian sec-
tor. Government could regulate the decline but it appears pre-
pared to allow the market to determine survivors.
Some firms will manage to convert to the civilian sector.
The assisted conversion of defense businesses to the civilian
sector is a highly charged process. If a firm can produce tanks
and another knows how to produce automobiles, why subsidize the
uninitiated to do what there are competent firms already doing?
Conversion assistance schemes abound, with proposals to use
independent R&D funds for everything from non-military ventures
to fully-funded programs.
For those firms that manage to covert, with or without
assistance, there will be significant cultural adjustments.
Government contractors often have the customer providing capital
for specialized facilities and equipment. This is not normal
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procedure in the commercial market. In the defense industrial
world, requirements often advance the state of the art whereas in
the commercial market, state of the art is limited by costs and
competition. The two environments have drastically different
financial structures and supporting infrastructures capable of
preparing proposals.
Defense contractors are often organized along narrow com-
partmentalized, functional lines with little awareness of the
overall program. Many firms do business in both worlds but there
is little interconnection of personnel. Government and civilian
contractors both agree that there is a significant problem con-
verting personnel from one culture into being successful in the
other. It is also likely that management cannot make the transi-
tion.
A downsizing of the defense industry after Vietnam War
production ended was followed by massive displacements of profes-
sional and technical specialists. Conversion efforts then con-
sisted largely of acquiring non-defense firms and attempting to
expand into new markets. Most conversions failed, but primarily
at the plant level. The cultural shock was either too great or
the technologies offered by the defense firms simply were not
needed.
The conversion of defense plants, and other government capa-
bilities, should be studied by a Blue-Ribbon Panel assisted by
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industna.. and professional associations. This effort goes beyond
similar panels that have suggested acquisition reform since, in
this case, the government must ensure that defense-critical
industries are identified and it should make certain the capabil-
ity to produce is retained.
Critical Success Factors
There appears to be four main problem areas in which solu-
tions portend success for the President's dream. The first is
that everything depends upon the responsible and good behavior of
the Soviet Union. It may not be desirable to have your fundamen-
tal national security strategy so dependent upon the behavior of
the once "evil empire" but, for any of this to work, the Soviets
must return to their homeland, remain inwardly focused, and
continue the serious reductions in military capability they have
started. Additional drawdowns in naval and strategic nuclear
systems must follow soon. It would appear that Soviet behavior
can be modified to allow the transition but recent (December
1990) events portend other possibilities. Without continued
reputable and excellent behavior by the USSR, the President's new
strategy is simply not appropriate.
The second critical area demands that the intelligence
community must be able to surmount the new challenges. If fund-
ing for intelligence follows defense downward, then the reconsti-
tution portion of the new strategy is bankrupt. The intelligence
community should move into spheres they have traditionally under-
emphasized, such as the Third World and economics. They will also
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have significantly increased burdens demanded by the monitoring
and verification of compliance of arms control agreements. All
of this is possible if decision-makers recognize this crucial
underpinning of the new strategy.
The third area that can undermine a successful transition to
this new world will be the international behavior of allies and
the U.S. Congress. Clearly, none of this is going to happen
without Congress onboard. Secretary Cheney's efforts to articu-
late the new strategy are designed to ensure that the Department
of Defense is ahead of Congress and that the new policies are
adopted
.
If our European and Asian allies attempt to keep our forward
presence there, and their contribution to their own defense lower
than it should be, they will likely attempt to exploit our sepa-
ration of governmental powers. The debate over retaining a
forward overseas presence for U.S. forces has generally assumed
the nature of presumptions made by each side; i.e. unquestionably
we need to maintain a permanent presence, or, clearly we can now
return all the troops home. In the debate over retaining an
overseas presence, all sides should explain the rationale, the
benefits, and costs of their points of view.
The final critical success factor is the ability of private
industry to deliver. What is envisaged is not the same as indus-
trial mobilization. We need to both save our defense industrial
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base under very new conditions, and simultaneously reduce defense
spending. How can we do this when the Administration is not
willing to address the need for a national industrial policy?
Major changes in the way we do business are reguired to
retain both our technological position in the world and the
personnel necessary to meet newly defined defense needs. By
withdrawing forces from overseas and promising to reconstitute
forces within two years and return, the United States will have
fundamentally changed its international political-military pos-
ture. If upon internal investigation, it appears that we cannot
fulfill this promise, then the U.S. government should keep this
conclusion under wraps, endure the open-source critical debate
and criticism that it will face, and keep this declaratory
strategy operational.
Defense Business as Usual?
Major changes to the international environment have led
planners to a significant shift in the manner of addressing
problems and issues. The first order questions, such as "what is
America's role in the world, or the business and purpose of the
Department of Defense," now demand answers prior to consideration
of second order programming or efficiency issues, that have
dominated the traditional defense debate.
America's new role in the world will widen strategic plan-
ner's horizons to considering issues more befitting planners of a
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major international superpower, such as the long-term competi-
tion between nations, the economic, political, legal, scientific-
technical, and cultural aspects of competition, and uses of the
military for other than a Europe-centered global war with the
USSR. The U.S. cannot afford to indulge itself with "gold-plat-
ed" strategies capable of successfully dealing with all possible
contingencies on its own.
The world may move to a more integrated political structure,
or at least parts of the world will move in this direction. The
U.N. Charter still contains the framework for national armed
forces acting on behalf of the Security Council. Perhaps this
is the time to consider regional and global cooperation as
alternative models to the nation-state. The nations of the world
rejected this direction when they failed to adopt the U.N.-
sponsored Law of the Sea Treaty and its "Common Heritage of
Mankind" approach to certain types of "common" ocean resources.
True, that approach was flawed, given the political realities of
its day, but perhaps this is the time to amend international
organizations, and see if they can do better than in the past.
Changes in the international environment will likely be more
significant in the next twenty years than in the last twenty.
Planning for the long-term requires a 10-20 year planning hori-
zon. We cannot afford to lock up our strategic options with
political and military assumptions or force structures that were
developed out of a political world which no longer exists.
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The fundamental shift in t ne way programming planners look
at the world will lead to less emphasis on the USSR and Europe, a
redirection toward other areas of the world, and managing day-to-
day competition with other powers. All this will occur while the
U.S. has significantly less capable tools in its kit. Rather than
acting as a "Chairman of the Board" with our allies, America's
appropriate future role may be that of "first among equals" 63 if
it does not withdraw to the North American continent in splendid
isolationism. If we elect to stay engaged in the world, is it
likely that we will engage in "winning" the peace as we once
prepared to "win" war? If so, it implies the creation of a truly
integrated and nonconfrontational governmental and commercial
planning process.
Problems in American defense planning have, for some time,
provoked calls for more and better planning. Evidence of plan-
ning problems is found in four major areas of Department of
Defense planning: strategic goals and objectives that lacked
clarity; a functional organizational design which impedes mission
integration; overemphasis on budgets and programming needs to the
detriment of overall policies and strategies; and ignoring other
agencies, competitors and the external environment. We have the
opportunity to and should improve the quality of our national
strategic or long-range planning while we answer the call made by
the President at Aspen.
A major planning problem was a lack of a coordinated effort
to integrate the government's primary goals, policies and action
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sequences into a cohesive whole. Analysis and review of Ameri-
ca's fundamental role in the world should force the DoD to solve
this basic problem, at least temporarily. Sound strategic man-
agement, of which strategic planning is but one component, inte-
grates an organization's principal goals, policies and action se-
quences into a cohesive whole. It marshals, allocates, and
shapes an organization's resources into a unique and viable
posture based on its relative internal competencies and shortcom-
ings, anticipated changes in the environment, and contingent
moves by intelligent opponents. Strategic management is con-
cerned with the management of the whole enterprise, not just its
functional components or sub-parts.
The U.S. government has not developed truly successful and
coherent defense, industrial, scientific, engineering, oceans,
etc. policies since the end of the Second World War. Yet, we do
have an extremely successful agricultural policy and supporting
programs. The federal government has also successfully managed
complicated programs for space exploration, rural electrifica-
tion, and transportation. This is the time to once again exercise
leadership and provide guidance and support for success.
It becomes a challenge for the organizational leader to
combine and direct the efforts and activities of the other mem-
bers of an organization toward the successful completion of a
stated mission or purpose. It is this type of effort that we
will see the Bush Administration attempt to perform while it
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undergoes a fundamental restructuring of /nerica's role in the
world, and missions for its military forces. It will be this
effort, not the old roles and missions, that NATO political
leadership will have to understand to deal effectively with the
United States as it undergoes internal self-examination.
In contrast to most other types of planning, strategic
management also analyzes an organization's external environment
and internal climate, searches for new trends, discontinuities,
surprises, and competitive advantages. Since its scope is broader
than other types of planning, it typically embodies more qualita-
tive shifts in direction than anticipated from the long-range
planning process. Also guided by an idealized vision of the
future, strategic management is much more action oriented. The
organization attempts to keep its options open, considering a
variety of possible alternatives to respond promptly to unfore-
seen contingencies as it seeks its ideal.
Long-range planning which has typified NATO planning in past
decades, on the other hand, focuses more on specifying goals and
objectives, translating them into current budgets and work pro-
grams. The objective of long-range planners (and short-range
planners for that matter) is to work backward from goals to
programs and budgets to document the sequence of decisions and
actions necessary to achieve the desired future, embodied in the
goals. Long-range planning, as a consequence, assumes that
current trends will continue into the future and plans tend to be
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linear extrapolations of the present. Clearly, this is no longer
feasible.
To be effective, strategic management assumes certain neces-
sary conditions. Among the conditions are: an agreement, or at
least consensus, on goals and objectives; a process by which the
organization can scan its environment, monitor trends, and assess
its competitors; a management information system based on an
integrated communication and control system; and a review and
monitoring process to determine whether the current strategies
are viable or should be revamped.
The top-down vision of the future, outlined by the President
in Aspen, will usher in governmental political-military goals and
objectives. The major players will be both domestic and interna-
tional, and it is likely that a consensus wi 11 be reached. It is
uncertain which group or groups will dominate the debate but the
American public's willingness to sustain heavy defense burdens
concurrently with large domestic programs (including the Savings
& Loan bailout) should not be assumed in the absence of a clear
and present danger.
Effective strategic management is not possible without
responsive and timely feedback. The debate over the President's
new strategy should include an analysis of the political goals
sought by the forward deployment of U.S. forces, and the politi-
cal environment that compelled the formulation of America's
alliance structure. If those goals have been attained, if the
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internatio lal environment has drastically changed, then it should
not shock anyone that the fundamental strategy and resulting
force structure are s abject to wholesale renegotiation. That it
is being done in a thoughtful and comprehensive manner, with the
full participation of domestic interests and allies, should be
comforting.
Much legislation will be required as a result of the changes
in the international system - so this exercise is not going to
occur only in the Executive Branch of government. The two gov-
ernment branches can cooperate or they can assume an adversarial
relationship. Congress will cut forces and programs - with or
without a carefully thought out plan. The Executive Branch must
present all possible options for cuts to the legislature - even
those that wrench the very souls of the leaders of a particular
combat arms or military service. The Administration appears to
be prepared to meet this challenge.
Should the services refuse to present realistic plans to the
DoD, or play end-around games with Congress, the cuts will be
made anyway. The services could find themselves playing catch-up,
and redrafting strategies from whatever forces the resulting
legislation permits. The looming debate should be about goals
and objectives, realizing that they do not have to be what they
were in the past. If we are realistic about these goals and
objectives, there is every likelihood that we can reach a consen-
sus on force requirements. If we engage in debate over force
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structure, we will perhaps stumble into a strategy that will not
serve the national interests in the 21st Cen-ury.
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